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Life provides man with no scientific footholds on reality, suggests to him no narrative plots, 
offers no rhythmic metaphor to confirm the moving resonance of a human theme.  If he chooses 
to write tragedy, then tragedy it will be; if comedy, then that is what will come of it; and if 
burlesque, he, the sole reader, must learn to laugh at its misanthropic caricatures of the only 
person he knows - himself.  (Kelly, 1969, p. 24) 
 
 
-o-O-o-                          -o-O-o-                          -o-O-o- 
 
 
 Kelly's Personal Construct Theory (PCT) and the systems approach are, at least at first 
sight, two different traditions in approaching the therapeutic endeavor. Originally, PCT 
emphasized processes of construction of a single individual (e.g., Bannister & Fransella, 1986) 
and only recently gradually expanded this focus to include couples (e.g., Ryle, 1975, G. 
Neimeyer, 1985). Therefore, its therapeutic approach was mainly intrapsychic or dyadic. 
Conversely, the conceptualization of a problem from a systemic perspective always included the 
family system. In that context, individual behavior was primarily understood as a function of the 
larger family system. As a consequence, systemic treatment focused on family groups thereby de-
emphasizing individual therapy.  
 Recently, some changes have taken place; the systemic movement has become much 
more flexible both in acknowledging the necessity of paying more attention to the individual 
(even to the point of treating only individuals or dyads instead of the entire family, e.g., Fisch, 
Weakland & Segal, 1978) and in adopting a constructivist epistemological position (e.g., 
Hoffman, 1988a;  Efran, Lukens & Lukens, 1988). On the other hand, some personal construct 
therapists have elaborated a construct approach to systemic interventions (Procter, 1978; 1981; 
1985a; Feixas, Cunillera & Villegas, 1987) that set some bases for a convergence of both 
approaches.  
 Although the similarities between current systemic therapies and Kelly's (1955) PCT have 
been described elsewhere (Feixas, 1990b), they can be summarized in the following way: 
 (1) PCT and the systemic therapies share a common epistemological stance: 
constructivism.  Even though there are notable differences among the various systemic therapies, 
they agree in viewing knowledge as resulting from a construing process rather than a direct 
representation of reality. 
 (2) PCT can be described as a systemic theory.  It contains the properties of totality, 
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equifinality, feedback, and a tendency to constant states postulated by systemic theorists about 
open systems. 
 (3) PCT and the systemic therapies take similar positions on several relevant clinical 
issues such as the influence of labeling in pathology, the central role of anticipation, the view of 
"resistance" as a coherent movement of the system, the use of the client's language and 
metaphors, the exploration of intended solutions, the potential use of prescriptions, and the view 
of therapy as a reconstructive process. 
 Besides these similarities, this paper explores the clinical usefulness of incorporating 
personal construct concepts and methods into systemic practice.  As an initial step, I will include 
the analysis of Kelly's constructivism in the context of other constructivist positions that 
continue to inspire many systemic developments. I then outline a model of change that has 
applicability to both individual and systemic therapies and introduce the concept of the family 
construct system as a means of bridging these two distinct therapeutic traditions. I next illustrate 
the application of some of these concepts and methods in the context of a brief clinical case 
study and outline some of the issues entailed in strategizing about both content and process in 
the practice of family therapy. Finally, I conclude with some implications for research and an 
expression of optimism regarding the mutual enrichment of individual and family-based 
constructivist perspectives. 
 
PERSONAL CONSTRUCT THEORY AND SYSTEMIC CONSTRUCTIVISM 
 PCT and the systemic therapies share a common epistemological stance: constructivism. 
Even though there are notable differences among the various systemic therapies (Anderson & 
Goolishian, 1988; Feixas, 1990b; Kenny & Gardner, 1988), they agree in viewing knowledge as 
resulting from a construing process rather than a direct representation of reality. Because 
knowledge of the external world is actively construed by the subject (observer) in a given social 
context (Berger & Luckman, 1966), the idea of having a “true” knowledge about reality vanishes 
(Von Glasersfeld, 1984). Thus, Kelly's (Kelly, 1955) assertion that reality can be interpreted in a 
variety of ways is shared by many constructivist thinkers (e.g., Bateson, 1979; Kenny & Gardner, 
1988; Mahoney, 1988; Maturana & Varela, 1987; Von Foerster, 1981; Watzlawick, 1984). This 
view contrasts with the traditional one, objectivism, which holds that reality is directly 
represented in the subject's mind which passively receives the stimuli from the environment.  
This latter perspective has dominated Western thinking for centuries.  The core epistemological 
issue, the nature of knowledge, has been already pointed to in the previous paragraph. The 
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notion of knowledge as invention (e.g., von Glasersfeld, 1984) contrasts with the objectivist 
belief in discovering an already existing truth. The evolutionary nature of knowledge has been 
described by Popper (1972), Campbell (1972), and others. Rejecting the assumption of 
knowledge as a true belief, Popper (1959) puts forward a Non-Justificationist epistemology 
which asserts that data are conceptual, and our hypotheses have only the status of conjectures 
(Popper, 1963) as long as they are not falsified. In short, human organisms are “theories of their 
environments” and our knowledge structures are adaptations to that environment subject to 
selective processes via refutation or invalidation.  
 The problem of a constructivist position has to do with the question of how we assign 
validity to our knowledge. If our perceptions are not to be taken for granted, what criteria can we 
use to decide whether to incorporate or refuse a bit of knowledge in our system, either at the 
level of single individuals or at the level of science itself? Again an evolutionary response is 
appropriate.  A hypothesis is regarded as (provisionally) valid as long as it fits with the context 
and seems to be viable (von Glasersfeld, 1984). It should also be, to a certain extent, consistent 
with previous acquired knowledge (e.g., Kelly, 1955) in order to be integrated in our system. The 
social constructionist movement (e.g., Berger & Luckman, 1966; Gergen, 1985) and the 
contemporary philosophers of science (e.g., Kuhn, 1962) have emphasized the social nature of 
knowledge. It arises in the context of a social interaction influenced by language, culture and 
family environments, and the very process of determining its validity is a social process in itself. 
 Both Kelly (1955) and Bateson (1979) view the creation of knowledge as a process 
involving the grasping of differences rather than the concept formation notion proposed by the 
information processing paradigm derived from the objectivist position. Kelly (1955) further 
emphasizes the organization of knowledge (constructs) in a hierarchical self-organized system, 
much as Maturana and Varela (e.g., 1987), at a more abstract level, describe living organisms as 
autonomous, autopoietic systems that create their own structure. As an extension of this notion, 
the above mentioned Chilean biologists conceive of interaction between living organisms not as 
a direct transmission of information (interactive instruction), but as a complex process of 
coupling two autonomous self-organized structures. 
 Despite these points of agreement on their epistemological preference for 
constructivism, PCT and the systemic therapies reached constructivism through quite different 
paths and hold some distinctive assumptions. I therefore present the epistemological evolution 
of Kelly’s (1995) approach first, give a brief account of systemic constructivism, and conclude 
this section by elucidating some of their contrasts as well as similarities. 
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Kelly's Constructive Alternativism 
 George A. Kelly, along with Bartlett and Piaget, was among the earliest constructivist 
thinkers in psychology, and pioneered the constructivist therapies (Mahoney & Gabriel, 1987; 
Feixas & Villegas, 1990).  His approach to psychology and psychotherapy (Kelly, 1955) has been 
one of the few which reveals its epistemological bases. Furthermore, although Kelly was 
influenced by Vaihinger and Dewey, he reached his epistemological position chiefly through  his 
own clinical practice. He started his clinical and academic career during the 1930's in a college 
covering a wide rural area. Because he was one of the three faculty members and the only clinical 
psychologist in the department, he had few resources with which to accomplish the clinical and 
educational responsibilities his position entailed. Moreover, psychology -and especially 
psychotherapy- was very immature, offering few alternatives to the practitioner. Kelly soon 
rejected the S-R paradigm because of its simplicity and inability to solve the clinical problems he 
was facing; however, he was not convinced by the obvious alternative, psychoanalysis.  
So I began fabricating "insights."  I deliberately offered "preposterous interpretations" to my 
clients.  Some of them were as un Freudian as I could make them....  My only criteria were that 
the explanation account for the crucial facts as the client saw them and that it carry implications 
for approaching the future in a different way [italics added].... 
What happened?  Well, many of my preposterous explanations worked, some of them 
surprisingly well.  To be sure, the wilder ones fell flat, but a reexamination of the interviews often 
suggested where the client's difficulty with them lay.  (Kelly, 1969e, p. 52) 
 Thus, through clinical experimentation Kelly realized the central role of the 
(re)construction of the client's experience in terms of generating more viable alternatives. As set 
forth above, the main criteria was not the truth value of the reinterpretation but (a) its relevance 
to account for what the client considered crucial and (b) its potential for the generation of an 
alternative way of facing the future. Kelly's main emphasis lies on the possibility of generating 
new alternative constructions for any given event:  "No one needs to paint himself into a corner; 
no one needs to be completely hemmed by circumstances; no one needs to be victim of his 
biography" (Kelly, 1955, p. 15).  
 Because of this emphasis on the generation of alternatives, Kelly labeled his 
epistemological principle constructive alternativism: "Reality is subject to many alternative constructions, 
some of which may prove to be more fruitful than others" (Kelly, 1969a, p. 96). These “fruitful” 
constructions would be viable and fit with a person’s previous system of construing. 
 One of the most interesting features of Kelly's constructivism is not only that it has been 
developed through clinical practice but that the entire corpus of personal construct psychology (a 
psychological theory, a clinical theory, assessment methods, strategies for intervention, and 
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therapeutic techniques) has been coherently derived from Kelly's constructivist assumptions. 
Such a consistency among these different levels of theory and practice is a rarity in psychology, 
particularly in psychotherapy (Feixas & Villegas, 1990; Neimeyer, 1988).  
 In his fundamental postulate, Kelly (1955) asserted that “a person's processes are 
psychologically channelized by the ways in which he anticipates events” (Kelly, 1955, p. 46). As 
Bruner (1956) noted, the anticipation of the future seems to be the main motivational principle 
of PCT. Thus, the way a person anticipates, for Kelly, is his or her most relevant characteristic.  
Such an outlook results in the conceptualization of human beings as proactive, goal directed, and 
purposive.  In this way, Kelly's constructivism was developed through his psychological theory 
and practice instead of only being an armchair reflection expressed in the epistemological 
chapter of his 1955 work.  I will describe some of these constructivist issues in the section 
corresponding to the personal construct model of change. 
 
Systemic Constructivism 
 In earlier systemic formulations still regarded as central for many family therapists (e.g., 
Watzlawick, et al, 1967; Haley, 1963), the presenting problem was considered in the context of a 
behavior sequence of the family members in which the symptom had a homeostatic function 
related to the whole system. Either it was related to tri generational coalitions (e.g., Haley, 1963; 
Minuchin, 1974) or the solution attempted by the family to solve the problem was considered a 
key segment of the behavioral pattern that perpetuates the problem (Watzlawick, Weakland, & 
Fisch, 1974). However, in the last decade some systemic therapists have adopted a constructivist 
oriented stance. 
 Gregory Bateson, one of the precursors of the systemic family movement, elaborated his 
epistemological thoughts (e.g., 1972, 1979) in a way that has greatly influenced the sensitivity of 
many systemic therapists about the importance of the process of knowing and its relevance for 
clinical practice. As a result, further constructivist authors such as Von Glasersfeld (e.g., 1984), 
Von Foerster (e.g., 1981), and Maturana and Varela (e.g., 1987), along with Bateson, are among 
the most quoted sources of theoretical and clinical inspiration in the systemic literature of the 
past decade. 
 Hoffman (1985, 1988) is perhaps the author who has most clearly narrated the evolution 
of the systemic movement towards constructivism. The initial focus on behavior sequences has 
shifted to the investigation of meanings, that is, how behaviors are construed by different family 
members. Problems are now explained in terms of family myths, premises, or shared belief 
systems that are coherent with symptomatic behaviors. Thus the new systemic techniques, for 
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example circular questioning, are devised to make explicit and challenge those family premises. A 
paradigmatic example of this constructivist systemic approach is represented by the Milan team 
formed by Boscolo and Cecchin (Boscolo, Cecchin, Hoffman, & Penn, 1987). Other relevant 
examples are Watzlawick's (1984) edited book, Keeney's (1983) conceptualization of change, 
Goolishian's (e.g., Goolishian & Winderman, 1988) notion of problem determined systems, and 
other derived clinical applications. An outstanding sign of its influence in the field was the 
appearance of a special issue on constructivism in The Family Therapy Networker (1988), in 
which Efran, Lukens and Lukens (1988) and others present constructivism, its clinical 
implications, and also its relation with Kelly's epistemology and clinical position. 
 Considering that Humberto Maturana (Alexander & Neimeyer, 1989) can be regarded as 
an epistemologist who has inspired a great deal of systemic epistemological thinking and 
(Anderson, & Goolishian, 1988) his position has been considered more “radical” than that of 
Kelly, I will focus on a comparison on these two authors as a way to discuss the epistemological 
relationship between PCT and the systemic therapies. 
 
 Kelly and Maturana:  An ontological contrast 
 Because they share more assumptions than not, I first briefly point to some similarities 
between the thinking of Kelly and Maturana. As explained earlier, both authors hold a common 
constructivist position at the epistemological level. Likewise, both deny the possibility of a true 
and objective knowledge of reality. As noted by R. Neimeyer and Feixas (1990b) Maturana's 
concept of autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela, 1980) -- the view of living systems as self-organized 
and as determining their own evolution -- has its parallel in PCT's choice corollary. According to 
the latter, every system makes those decisions that increase its predictive power, those that go in 
the direction of a greater elaboration of the system. Sometimes a person's choice can even 
include a "symptom" in order to increase the scope or precision of his or her anticipatory 
structures. In this sense, there is no "right" direction of elaboration to be defined by an arbitrary 
observer: “It is the system itself that regulates the direction and extent of change” (R. Neimeyer 
& Feixas, 1990b); therefore, as Maturana (Maturana & Varela, 1987) maintains, fluctuations in 
the environment can, at most, "trigger" change in the living system. This leads us to the ideas of 
structural determinism and operational closure (Maturana & Varela, 1980) which suggest that changes 
that occur in any living system are determined by the characteristics of its structure rather than 
by “external reality”. Similarly, Kelly, in his modulation corollary, states that “the variation in a 
person's construction system is limited by the permeability of (its superordinate) constructs” 
(Kelly, 1955, p. 77). This means that a given system does not allow for just any change, but only 
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for a limited range of alternatives. The range of existing possibilities within the system depends 
on the degree to which its superordinate structure allows for the inclusion of new 
experience -- the system's permeability (flexibility).   
 Another parallelism can be found in Maturana's aphorism, "anything said is said by an 
observer" (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 8) which intends to convey the idea that when someone 
makes a statement about reality that person is talking about his or her view of reality. Attention 
must therefore be directed to the observer rather than to that “reality”.  Similarly, Kelly asserts:  
When I say Professor Lindzey's left shoe is an "introvert," everyone looks at his shoe as if this were 
something his shoe was responsible for. Or if I say that Professor Cattell's head is "discursive," 
everyone looks over at him, as if the proposition had popped out of his head instead of out of 
mine. Don't look at his head!  Don't look at that shoe!  Look at me; I'm the one who is responsible 
for the statement. (Kelly, 1969b, p. 72) 
 Despite their epistemological similarities, Maturana and Kelly disagree in their belief 
about the existence of reality. For the former “nothing exists outside language” and reality is only 
“an explanatory proposition” (Maturana, 1988, p. 80). Although Kelly would agree in that the 
only criterion for the validation of our hypotheses is the internal correlation between 
anticipations (superordinate constructs) and low order sensory discriminations (subordinate 
constructs), he states unambiguously his presumption about the existence of reality: “We presume 
that the universe is really existing and that man is gradually coming to understand it” (Kelly, 1955, p. 6). This 
straight disagreement is not, however, epistemological but ontological (Held & Pols, 1985). Both 
agree that human beings cannot come to know reality directly (an epistemological position) but 
disagree in their belief on whether or not reality exists independent of an observer (an 
ontological position). Kelly presumes the existence of reality (a position traditionally related to 
realism or materialism) and Maturana asserts that reality does not exist (a position traditionally 
related to idealism and solipsism).  
 In looking at this divergence, if one takes as rigorous a point of view as Held & Pols 
(1985; 1987) do, then one realizes that it is a logical inconsistency to make any kind of statement 
about the existence of reality   that is, any kind of ontological statement.  
 
A considerable part of the family therapy field adopts an epistemology ... NR ["NR" stands for 
"no independent reality attainable" (p. 456)], and if one adopts an epistemology of that kind, a 
contradiction will arise if one also adopts a metaphysics/ontology    any metaphysics/ontology.  
(Held & Pols, 1987, p. 457).  
 Now that this logical inconsistency is recognized, let me tentatively pursue this 
ontological controversy for a moment.  To assert the metaphysical/ontological existence of 
reality presents several advantages (despite the already acknowledged disadvantage of logical 
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inconsistency).  It accounts for a number of phenomena that most of us see intuitively as “bits of 
reality”: abuse, violence, physical illness, and death.  These phenomena are frequently raised as 
objections to constructivism (e.g., Taggart, 1985).  To share a personal example, I recently had 
the experience of a minor car accident.  Even if it was not serious I, as a living system, received a 
distressing perturbation from the environment.  There was something "out there" influencing 
me.  Of course, my structure (body constitution, position, psychological state) determined the 
damage the impact produced on my body as well as on my cognitive construction of the event.  
But some bit of reality triggered (only triggered) some changes in my physical and psychological 
state.  Perhaps it was not an “interactive instruction”, but something out there was structurally 
coupling my body in a way that my autopoietic and autonomous system had not chosen!   
 On the other hand, other relevant thinkers have expressed more or less explicitly this 
logically inconsistent (though at another level intuitively reasonable) position.  Max Planck, 
considered to be the first forerunner of quantum physics, asserted simultaneously that “(1) there 
is a real outer world which exists independently of our act of knowing” and that  “(2) the real 
outer world is not directly knowable” (Planck, 1932, p. 32).  Prigogine, along with quantum 
physicists and many other constructivists, proposes a view of matter (reality) that depends to 
some extent on the observer, “a new view of matter in which matter is no longer the passive 
substance described by the mechanistic world view” (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984).  Therefore 
matter, though not passive, exists.  This could be deduced even from von Glasersfeld's writings.  
“The only aspect of that ‘real’ world that actually enters into the realm of experience is its 
constraints” (von Glasersfeld, 1984, p. 24).  Although logically inconsistent with epistemological 
constructivism, one could take Kelly's position and assert that the universe really exists even 
though it cannot enter our “realm of experience” except through “its constraints.” 
 This ontological divergence between Kelly and Maturana had been previously suspected 
by Mahoney (1988) and Kenny & Gardner (1988).  In consequence, the latter do not consider 
Maturana as constructivist but as the creator of the alternative “bring forth paradigm” (Kenny & 
Gardner, 1988, p. 9).  As noted earlier my position is different; I consider Maturana one of the 
more relevant contributors to contemporary constructivism despite his ontological claim for the 
inexistence of reality. 
 Mahoney (1988), on the other hand, divides critical constructivists, those who 
“acknowledge the existence of a ‘real’ external world”, from radical1 constructivists, “an 
approach that is basically indistinguishable from 'idealism'” (Mahoney, 1988, p. 4).  I find this 
solution elegant though not completely accurate. In order to distinguish among constructivist 
thinkers, Mahoney (1988) uses not an epistemological, but an ontological criterion.  
Personal constructs in systemic practice 
 
 
 
 
  10
 At the end, however, this issue becomes a matter of classification of thinkers and written 
thoughts, a matter of labeling.  But one of the clinical points of constructivism is precisely the 
importance of the labels applied to behaviors, thoughts, and feelings.  Because labels and 
“languaging” have a prominent (perhaps exclusive) role in social domains, it becomes important 
to point out the distinctions relevant thinkers make, since they inspire, to some extent, the 
clinical practice of a number of therapists. 
 
 A MODEL OF CONSTRUCT SYSTEMS CHANGE 
 In a critical article, Golann (1987) notes how the adoption of cybernetic and 
constructivist perspectives in the family therapy field “has resulted in an unnecessary devaluation 
of representational description of family interaction” (p. 331). Because from a “second-order”1 
cybernetic perspective any description tells us more about the observer than about the observed 
event, it seems that description has little place within a constructivist framework. Actually, the 
assertion that constructivism implies that therapists avoid conceptualizing, attaching labels, and 
creating a “road map” about the client's system can be seen as incoherent. Certainly, Kelly's 
commitment to constructivism did not curb him of his interest in conceptualizing the 
functioning of the construing systems. Moreover, he derived his psychological theory in 
congruence with his epistemological conviction.  
 Actually, the assertion that constructivism implies that therapists avoid conceptualizing, 
attaching labels, and creating a “road map” about the client's system can be seen as incoherent.  
Although descriptions of a family interaction are not representational descriptions but 
constructions, therapists, just as any other human being, need to construe the events they are 
dealing with. Kelly postulated that therapists should have a professional subsystem of construing 
(which would doubtless bear a relationship with their personal construct systems) in order to 
possess the skills to discriminate among clinical events they face in their everyday practice. This 
professional system should be comprehensive and elaborated in such a way as to acquire the 
greater predictive power. Of course, this subsystem is furnished with the concepts of the 
therapist's particular orientation. Once Kelly recognized the impossibility of acting without a 
model, he tried to elaborate a personal construct model coherent with the constructivist position. 
As long as we, as therapists, cannot operate without a "prejudice," let's have at least a 
constructivist prejudice.  
 A model of human processes and change should have the following characteristics to be 
considered coherent with a constructivist epistemology: (a) it should be centered in the process of 
construing rather than the “reality” construed (content); (b) it should be contextualist2; that is, it 
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should account for the way broader systems of construing interact with narrower ones; and (c) it 
should be reflexive, that is, it should account for the construing processes of both the observer 
and the observed. I believe that PCT can provide such a constructivist model.  
 Next, I outline the personal construct model of human functioning. Because, for PCT, 
life is continuous movement, this is also a model of change. PCT is organized in eleven 
corollaries that develop a fundamental postulate (mentioned above). A formal presentation can 
be found in other works (e.g., Kelly, 1963; Bannister & Fransella, 1986; R. Neimeyer, 1987a). To 
take a more informal stand, I focus the cycle of experience, also proposed by Kelly (1970) and 
lately elaborated by later construct theorists (R. Neimeyer, 1985; Feixas & Villegas, 1990). 
 
PCT as a process-centered model  
 From a constructivist view, experience plays a crucial and exclusive role in the generation 
of knowledge. For Kelly, the process of experience is an intrinsic part of being human and, 
therefore, he is not concerned with explaining its causes and motives -- the why. Rather, he 
proposes to consider this very process as the more fundamental mechanism of change and 
evolution. He thought that a deep understanding of this mechanism, as a continuous circular 
process (see figure 1), would enable us to better comprehend human action instead of just 
original causes and impulses. Because the universe itself is constantly transforming, this “invites 
the person to place new constructions upon them (events) whenever something unexpected 
happens” (Kelly, 1955 p. 72).  
 
Figure 1. The experience cycle 
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 Kelly proposed the metaphor “man-the-scientist” to describe the cycle of experience. He 
compared everyday human activity with that of the scientist. The first stage of this cycle, which 
emerges from previous cycles, refers to the anticipatory nature of human existence as well as the 
predictive aspiration of science. The anticipations (constructs) or hypotheses are hierarchically 
organized in a system which serves both for understanding events and for anticipating the future. 
As scientific hypotheses, anticipations are linked to a whole theory, the personal construct 
system.  
 This comparison between the human being and the scientist does not imply that people 
are aware of having hypotheses (and theories) in the same way as scientists are. Even though we 
are unaware of it, at any single moment of our existence we are involved in this process of 
anticipation. For example, in selecting a key out of a set to open a closed door one anticipates 
making the right selection. There is enough investment to act according to this anticipation and 
take the key and try to open the door, that is, to encounter the event. The outcome of this behavior 
provides a confirmation or disconfirmation of the anticipation, which in turn leads one to carry out 
a constructive revision. In case of validation (positive feedback) of the hypothesis, the distinction 
which made possible that choice is consolidated in the system. In case of invalidation (negative 
feedback), new constructions should evolve to guide the subsequent behavior. A crucial question 
at this stage is how an anticipation becomes validated or invalidated. For Kelly (1955) it is not 
reality that provides (in)validation. Instead, (in)validation is “subjectively construed” (p. 158). 
That is, the hypothesis involves its own criteria, in terms of low order sensory constructs, for 
(in)validation. As noted elsewhere (Feixas, 1990b), the cycle of experience can be summarized as 
a feedback loop in which behavior (represented by the encounter stage) and anticipation 
influence each other in a circular way.  
 More attention must be paid here to the nature of the person's anticipations -their 
personal constructs. They are reports of a difference, in Batesonian terms (see Feixas, 1990a; for a 
comparison between Kelly and Bateson), and evolve every time we make a distinction. 
Constructs are the way in which we perceive things or people as either similar to or different 
from each other. In this sense, constructs are dichotomous for, as Kelly (1955) asserts, “much of 
our language ... implies a contrast which it does not explicitly state. Our speech would be 
meaningless otherwise…” (pp. 62-63). Certainly, meaning is constructed through contrasting 
differences. Moreover, meaning arises from the way two or more constructs are related. The 
construct “religious vs. atheist” can bear different relationships with the construct “good vs. 
bad”. In some families “religious” is linked with “good”, and “atheist” with “bad”, while in 
others this relationship is reversed, or non-implicative (to be “religious” is considered neither 
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“bad” nor “good”). PCT has elaborated models to account for the different possible 
relationships among constructs (a summary of one of these models is presented in Feixas, 
1990b). In addition, PCT inspires more precise models for specific areas such as that proposed 
by Viney, Benjamin and Preston (1988) for the elderly.  
 
PCT as a contextualist model  
 Although this description of the construing process can be seen as highly individualistic 
(as the idea of “personal construct” suggests), this model has been adapted by Procter (1978; 
1981; 1985a) and Feixas (1990a) to describe family construct systems. In fact, what Kelly 
proposed was a model of functioning for construing systems, but because validation of a 
personal construct system is mainly provided in an interpersonal domain -the family in one's 
early years, and wider systems later (Procter & Parry, 1978)-, construct theory allows itself to be 
extended to wider systems of construing. According to Procter (1981, p. 354) this extension has 
“simply not yet been elaborated”. Feixas (1990a) tentatively proposes an adaptation of PCT 
corollaries to describe family and other multi personal construct systems.  
 Procter (1978) has added two new corollaries, related to groups and families, to PCT as a 
foundation for his theory of the Family Construct System (FCS). In this approach families 
negotiate a common reality, the FCS, that “provides the members with alternative 'slots' so they 
do not necessarily have to be in agreement” (Procter, 1981, p. 355).  
 One of the main advantages of PCT, as extended by Procter (1978), is that it uses the 
same model to describe the construing processes of personal systems and those of family or 
wider systems. Furthermore, it can provide a frame to explain the interaction in families. Using 
this model in previous research, my colleagues and I (Feixas, Cunillera & Villegas, 1987), 
graphically presented this “overlap” among personal construct systems and FCS. One can see 
that personal construct systems of family members have a different degree of overlap with the 
FCS. The construing system of the members represented as having a major degree of overlap is 
mainly centered in the FCS. Their hierarchically superordinate constructs are embedded in the 
FCS, meaning that their main source of validation lies in the perceived meanings and attitudes of 
other family members. Conversely, those members who are represented as having a minor 
degree of overlap receive their major validation from other sources. Their more superordinate 
constructs (core constructs) are not tied to the FCS even though some of their views are (see 26 
for some empirical evidence about these points).   
 One could build a developmental story within this model. For example, children's 
systems of construing are mainly directed through the avenues of movement of their FCSs. As 
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children grow and acquire more individuation (Stierlin, 1987) as well as a more external life, their 
core constructs can become more independent of the FCS. Of course, this process could lead to 
many different developments. For example, young adults could also identify their thinking with 
that of the FCS in such a way that leaves little space for individuation. For these people, to leave 
the family is almost out of the range of available alternatives of their systems of construing. 
Many others, even though they leave their family of origin, often carry the same FCS when 
developing a new family.   
 The idea of a FCS goes beyond Kelly's (1955) emphasis on the individual construct 
system. In his writings, Procter (1978, 1981, 1985a) depicts a system of construing that has a life 
of its own. The FCS comprises a set of shared constructs of the family members that result from 
the partner's implicit negotiation and from the evolution of the system through the family life 
cycle. The FCS also includes the meta-perspectives (Laing, Phillipson & Lee, 1966) of the family 
members. In PCT, the mutual anticipation that one member has of the construction processes of 
the other (e.g., the way a father thinks his son views his mother) is termed a role-relationship. 
Thus, family (and other social) relationships can be viewed as role-relationships in which every 
member anticipates the others' thinking and behavior. Although such anticipation is both 
necessary and desirable, when one member behaves unexpectedly this can invalidate the others' 
role constructs. Because such innovative pathways are inherent to personal growth and 
development, the efforts made by other members to enforce conformity to older patterns are 
potential sources of conflict in family development. In these conflicts, one member often has to 
make a choice between personal growth and adapting to others' expectations. Symptoms of 
distress are often compromise solutions to that conflict. Notwithstanding these considerations, 
the FCS does not provide a model of “functional families” or the ideal “family life cycle” but 
rather a comprehensive model to understand those very different evolutionary paths that families 
undertake.  
 
PCT as a reflexive model  
 Several personal construct authors (e.g., Bannister, 1966) have emphasized the reflexive 
nature of Kelly's theory. In describing the process of construing, the personal construct model 
accounts for the very activity of describing the model, that is, it is able to account for the 
observer as well as for the observed. PCT is a way of construing how human beings construe. 
Family members, thus, can be viewed as family theorists who elaborate theories (constructs) to 
anticipate and predict each-others' behavior. Equally PCT, as Kelly (1969b) recognized, is in 
itself a construction and, as such, will be reconstructed: “our theory is frankly designed to 
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contribute effectively to its own eventual overthrow and displacement” (p. 66).  
 Reflexivity was also developed in Procter's (e.g., 1985a) extension of PCT. He postulates 
that every family member takes a position in the FCS. As I will develop in the next section, the 
notion of position entails two levels: the level of construction and the action level. When a 
problem arises every person or institution related to the problem takes a position. I found useful 
here the idea of problem determined systems (e.g., Anderson, Goolishian & Winderman, 1986). 
According to this, which the system to be considered includes not only family members but also 
the professionals “who are languaging about the problem” (Anderson et al., p. 9). In this sense it 
would be more accurate to talk about problem construct systems.  Procter (1985a) suggests 
including the views of these other professionals' when investigating presented problems as well 
as the therapist's own perspective. This would lead to the construction of therapeutic road maps 
or schemata as described in the following section. To conclude, one can assert that PCT, with 
the inclusion of Procter's FCS conceptualization, can be considered a process oriented, 
contextualist, and reflexive model of human processes. Therefore, it results in being a coherent 
and consistent “prejudice” for constructivist therapists.  
 
 FROM BEHAVIORS TO MEANINGS AND VICE VERSA  
 Hoffman (1985) viewed the development of the family therapy field as pendulum. Family 
therapy started with a great emphasis on behaviors, in part as a reaction against excessively 
intrapsychic approaches. Now, the constructivist orientation has swung the pendulum the other 
way: “ideas, beliefs, attitudes, feelings, premises, values and myths have been declared central 
again” (Hoffmann, 1985, p. 390). Furthermore, Hoffman considered “a shift in focus from 
behaviors to ideas” as one of the commonalities of “a general style of systemic therapy ... 
influenced by a constructivist approach” and she clearly states that “problems do exist but only 
in the realm of meanings” (p. 124).  
 Although I would basically agree with this new shift, I have always thought that 
pendulum movements were unbalanced and dangerous. I would prefer that the contribution of 
constructivism to the therapeutic arena would be comprehensive and holistic enough to also 
include some of the advances produced by family therapy's prior emphasis on behavior. 
However, I think that in the context of the previous evolution of the family therapy movement it 
may have been difficult to suggest an alternative to the “pendulum movement.” Perhaps the 
issue of the central relevance of meaning is difficult to present without conveying the image of a 
therapist doing nothing but conversation. The new constructivist therapist can appear to be a 
weak practitioner, especially when prescriptions, rituals, and other active interventions used by 
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traditional family therapists, have resulted so clinically useful. I like the idea of a conversational 
model for therapy (it brings new and fresh air into the therapy room) but this idea needs more 
elaboration, since the word “conversation” might also connote lack of clinical resources. 
Consequently, a constructivist model of change should include behaviors as well as meanings, 
and should allow the therapist to act upon both of these levels of experience.  
 In my view, the personal construct model of change offers a comprehensive frame that 
allows the therapist to consider behaviors as well as ideas as a focus, both at the moment of 
gathering information and when intervening. I think this would also fit with Hoffman's 
suggestion of a “both-and position” instead of an “either/or stance” (1988b, p. 67), and also 
with Keeney's (1982) view. In fact, Keeney and Ross' (1985), who also derive their approach 
from constructivism, have taken a similar stance in considering two different frames of 
reference, the semantic (related to meanings) and the political (related to patterns and sequences 
of behaviors). In his integrative model of intervention, Linares (personal communication, 1988) 
also proposes a model with two orthogonal dimensions. One of them, the epistemic vs. 
pragmatic dimension, corresponds with this comprehensive emphasis on considering meanings 
as well as behaviors.  
 Procter's (1985a) notion of position, defined as the integrated stance that each member 
of a system takes, entails two levels: the construction level and the action level. Taking into 
account the experience cycle (described in the previous section), Procter suggested that the 
position that one member takes involves his or her construction of him or herself, the 
construction of the other's thinking, and also several metaperspectives. The actions of this 
member are derived in accordance with those constructions. These actions are ways to test his or 
her hypotheses. At the same time, other members' actions are (in)validational evidence for 
further cycles of construing. In fact, the FCS is the interconnection of the family members' 
different positions in such a way that each one provides (in)validational evidence for the other. 
This is not only a conceptual device. Several clinical implications can be derived from this 
framework in both clinical assessment and intervention. 
 
Position as a Framework for Clinical Assessment 
 Keeping the notion of position in mind, a therapist may start at any given point, either 
with a concrete behavior (perhaps the one labeled as “the problem”) or an idea expressed by 
some family member. The therapist should then proceed to investigate concurrent behaviors and 
meanings of other problem-related members. To explain this with a case example, I will 
introduce the Pérez family (an alias). José requested that he and his wife, Rosa, be seen for help 
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with marital problems. The couple was in their early fifties and had Lucia, a profoundly retarded 
eighteen-year-old daughter. Rosa's own family had emigrated in her adolescence to Barcelona 
from Andalucia, a Southern area of Spain characterized by their emotional and expressive people 
harmonizing with their warm weather. On the other hand, José was born in Aragón, a dry area 
where people seldom tend to express feelings, and moved to Barcelona in his mid-twenties to 
meet Rosa and marry her a few months later. Rosa began the description of their lack of marital 
satisfaction by claiming that José was not providing all the love and affection she needed while 
she appeared to be a sensitive lover. She was talkative and generous in providing examples of 
José's lack of caring attitude towards her, as well as her eagerness to take an overprotective care 
of their daughter. That was especially painful for Rosa now that she was losing her sight and 
planned to retire from her present work as cleaning assistant in a hospital. She was becoming 
very depressed with the prospect of retiring and having such a calloused husband available only 
for their retarded girl. While she was describing this problem, José looked ashamed and 
concentrated his efforts in disputing minor details of his wife's description of his disregard 
towards her. 
  
Figure 2. A diagram for the positions of Rosa and José in their marital conflict. 
 
                                                                PEOPLE 
 ROSA JOSE 
               Construction:                     He prefers our daughter to me. 
                    Actually, he does not love me. 
 
 
 
 
She does not believe I love her 
after all these years!! I must 
take care of my daughter. 
 
 
                Action:                           Long face, nagging and criticism. 
             Does not take care of her daughter 
when José is around. 
(Over) protects daughter. Acts 
resentful, with no display of 
affection toward Rosa. 
 
 After the initial problem is presented, the process of gathering information about the 
members' positions on the problem can be carried out in several ways. In this case the therapist 
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first investigated José's view of the problem -- that is, his construction of her long faced criticism 
and nagging. José resented that she would not trust in his love proven through twenty years of 
marriage, but he was particularly struck by her lack of understanding of the fact that Lucia was 
completely dependent on their care. He further insinuated that if he did not provide such care 
their daughter would be left unattended (which led Rosa to respond energetically with the 
numerous things she was doing for Lucia). It appeared that the major conflict occurred when the 
three of them were together and José assumed an exclusive role in looking after the girl. This 
provided evidence for Rosa that he preferred Lucia to her, which is consistent with her slightly 
more distant attitude toward the girl.  That attitude, in turn, became confirmatory evidence for 
the idea that José should take care of their daughter. Procter (1985a) calls this the “bow tie” of 
the problem, which is represented for this case in Figure 2. 
 Of course, this schema should be complemented with various levels of metaperspectives 
and also with the view of other problem-related people as well as the therapist and other 
professionals' views (these aspects usually arise with the help of circular questions). To simplify, I 
reduced the issue to this dyadic “bow tie.” The point here is that the therapist, in using this 
framework, guides the interview in a way that goes from meanings to behaviors and vice versa 
throughout all the problem-related members. Procter (1985a) sees this way of interviewing as a 
zig-zag. Though the therapist does not have a straight list of questions, he or she has two levels 
(meaning and action) of investigation in mind, and has a process oriented hypothesis according 
to which each level (construing or action) is related to other member's meanings and behaviors. 
 
Position as a Framework for Intervention 
 Sometimes the conversation about the “bow tie” of the problem that arises in this kind 
of interview provides a different kind of (in)validational evidence that generates some kind of 
constructive revision (fifth stage of the cycle of experience) in the members' personal construct 
system or in the FCS. However, in many other situations the therapist has to intervene at some 
point of the cycle of family construing in order to trigger an alternative construction. Although 
every orientation is usually committed to a definite number of techniques, many others can be 
available to a therapist. In this sense, PCT is technically eclectic but theoretically consistent 
(Feixas & Villegas, 1990; R. Neimeyer, 1988; R. Neimeyer & Feixas, 1990a). Therefore, what 
characteristically defines the approach I am presenting is not the option a therapist will take on a 
technical level, but instead the therapeutic stance and the conceptualization. For example, one 
could try to reframe one of the family member's actions by attaching a different meaning to a 
behavior, one more congruous with the existing FCS. This, then, leaves open the possibility of 
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an alternative construction. On the other hand, one could try to bring into focus some kind of 
alternative behavior, either emphasizing an existing one or prescribing it, in order to provide 
evidence for (in)validation of a hypothesis of the family.  
 These therapeutic implications per se are not saying anything new to most family 
systemic therapists. They have been reframing and prescribing (with different emphases 
depending on their particular orientation) in this way for a long time. However, some therapeutic 
implications have been presented to illustrate the flexible framework that PCT, incorporating 
Procter's ideas of the FCS and the notion of position, can provide. As an example of this 
flexibility, we have presented elsewhere (Feixas, Cunillera, & Mateu, in press) a case example 
using dream interpretation in the context of a systemic family therapy. Besides this clinical 
flexibility, this proposal allows one to incorporate some personal construct techniques, such as 
hypothesis testing, fixed role, and family characterization sketch techniques, which are briefly 
summarized in the following paragraphs.  
 The first of these techniques, hypothesis testing, needs some theoretical elaboration before 
describing it as a technique.  It is derived from the model of change presented in the experience 
cycle. From the fresh perspective that this cycle offers, Kelly (1970) in his paper titled Behavior is 
an experiment presents a new view of behavior. From the circular model provided by this 
experience cycle, behavior can be viewed as both the antecedent and the consequence of a 
(re)construct- ion. Behavior is an encounter (third stage of the cycle) with the event. That 
encounter will provide the evidence to validate or invalidate an implied anticipation. In this 
sense, behavior is a form of inquiry, a “man's (sic) way of posing a question” (Kelly, 1969d, p. 
13). Although many forms of therapy (i.e., behavior therapy) consider behavior the "dependent" 
variable to be changed through the treatment, Kelly (1970) proposes that behavior can be the 
"independent" variable. That is, the therapist can prescribe (“manipulate” in the experimental 
metaphor) behavior to trigger a revision of the construing system. Thus, “the psychotherapist 
helps the client design and implement experiments” (Kelly, 1955, p. 941). This is expressed 
within the personal scientist metaphor. “Implement experiments” means putting into practice 
some of the client’s anticipations or hypotheses to watch how they work, and in helping clients 
to define what kind of evidence will serve to validate their hypotheses. In other words, 
hypothesis testing involves an agreement between therapist and client to carry out some tasks 
outside the therapy room. These tasks may sometimes take the form of a therapist's prescription. 
In further sessions, this technique involves a revision of the task and of some of the 
(in)validational and (re)constructive implications that it carries . As it has already been outlined 
(Feixas, 1990b), this technique bears some similarities to the prescription of tasks and rituals 
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commonly used by many systemic therapists although its rationale is presented in a somewhat 
different form. 
 In the case of the Pérez family, the therapist proposed a hypothesis testing experiment in 
the form of an enactment. Previous to that exercise I posed the following general reframing: 
Therapist:  I have noticed how much you love each other, beyond the fact you express your 
affection in different ways.  I also have to express my sincere admiration for the excellent care 
both of you have given all these years to your daughter.  I am impressed by the great deal of 
sacrifice you both are devoting to the difficult task of raising Lucia, although you carry out such 
efforts in different ways.   
 They listened with attention -- thus breaking their previous mutually interruptive pattern 
-- and some tears appeared in José's eyes. Then I suggested that I would take care of their 
daughter for the rest of the session (they brought Lucia to the session because did not trust 
anybody else to look after her), and I proposed an exercise for both of them. While seating 
beside Lucia, I invited them to turn their chairs in order to look into each other's faces. I then 
asked directly to Rosa:   
 Therapist: Do you agree with what I said, that you truly love your husband?   
 Rosa: Yes!! 
 T.: Well, why don't you tell him? 
 Rosa: Yes I love him, indeed.  (looking at me) 
T.: Don't tell it to me.  He is the one who needs to hear it!  Please, tell him looking straight at his 
eyes. 
 At this point she was seemingly embarrassed but had the courage to say “I love you 
José” with tears in her eyes.  I paralleled this process with José who also showed evident 
difficulties in expressing his love directly to her and appeared touched, too.   
 This intervention, as I said before, could be carried out by practitioners of various 
therapy orientations. The purpose here, however, is to show its theoretical relevance according 
to the notion of position. The reframing and the following exercise were aimed to provide 
striking evidence for the invalidation of the hypotheses they held that one did not love the other.  
Moreover, this intervention provided a balanced picture of both spouses as having problems in 
expressing feelings (both showed difficulties in expressing their love in the enactment) and as 
being responsible and active in the raising of their daughter (a reformulation that was mutually 
accepted). Therefore, by invalidating some of their constructions the intervention implicitly 
proposed an alteration on the bow tie of the problem, implying the possibility of alternative 
actions, which in turn would validate alternative constructions.  The following course of therapy 
enabled both partners to commit themselves in negotiated steps toward the satisfaction of their 
mutual needs -- negotiation that framed the next therapy sessions. 
 Kelly's (1955) fixed role technique is presented in many textbooks as a behavioral 
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technique. However, in my opinion it is a procedure directly derived from a constructivist stance.  
In the context of individual therapy, the therapist asks the client to write a “self-
characterization”, a minimally structured self-description of relevant aspects of the client's view 
about her or himself from the standpoint of a hypothetical friend who is neither unrealistically 
critical nor complimentary. Then, the therapist, preferably with the help of a small team of 
colleagues, elaborates an alternative description according to a set of simple formal rules (Kelly, 
1955). This alternative sketch is presented to the client to be enacted full time in his or her real 
life for a two week period. During this time, therapist and client meet approximately three times 
each week to ensure the goal of an accurate enactment of the prescribed new role.  In these 
sessions, the therapist supports the client and both role-play those situations which are especially 
difficult for the client to enact. Once the intensive two week period has finished, the therapist 
helps the client to contrast the distinct implications that the client's initial view and the 
prescribed sketch carry for some of the problems the client faces. This process leads clients to 
elaborate their own alternative perspective. The core of this procedure involves a forced 
generation of an alternative view in the clients' construing systems. Once clients are capable of 
holding two different views of the events they face everyday, they will be able to generate other 
alternatives without the therapist's directions. The remainder of therapy is devoted to providing 
clients with an appropriate context to elaborate their own alternatives. Thus, the essence of this 
technique is to generate a fully experienced alternative (as opposed to a verbal reframing or 
suggestion) in order to open the system of construing to new ways of construing. This 
procedure, of course, requires a more complete explanation (for more detailed accounts see, e.g., 
Kelly, 1955; and Epting, & Nazario, 1987).  An interesting example of the use of this technique 
in a couple's therapy context can be found in Kremsdorf (1985). 
 Alexander & Neimeyer (1989) have presented the family characterization sketch, an 
interesting adaptation for family practice of Kelly's (1955) self-characterization technique. This is 
presented as a pencil and paper task to be done individually by every member in the therapy 
room. Instructions for this task are the following: 
Write a brief character sketch of this family. Write it from the perspective of someone who 
knows the family intimately and sympathetically, perhaps better than anyone really knows the 
family. You should write it in third person. For example, begin by saying, “I know the Smith 
family...” (Alexander & Neimeyer, 1989, p. 113) 
The resulting individual commentaries can provide a good glimpse of their areas of convergence 
and divergence in terms of their family constructs. This is a way to enable the family members to 
make explicit their (usually implicit) view of themselves as a family group through their own 
writings and comments, with moderate participation of the therapist. 
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 In conclusion, PCT with the integration of Procter's FCS and position notions, can 
provide a comprehensive and flexible model both at a theoretical and clinical level. It articulates 
behaviors and meanings in a way that provides the therapist with a framework for mapping the 
system's interaction as well as for implementing a variety of interventions. Moreover, some of 
the personal construct techniques can be incorporated within the family therapist's set of tools. 
Several case examples in which this approach has been used can be found in Brennan and 
Williams (1988), Feixas, Cunillera and Mateu (1990), and Procter (1987). Feixas, Procter and 
Neimeyer (1993) offer a comprehensive review of these procedures. 
 
 STRATEGIZING ABOUT CONTENT, STRATEGIZING ABOUT PROCESS 
 The controversial issue of whether or not, and to what extent the therapist should be 
directive has been debated by psychotherapists for many years. In the history of the family 
therapy movement, it has taken the form of a discussion about the therapist's power. The notion 
of power (and related ideas such as “one up”, “one down”, and “control of the therapeutic 
relationship”) was broadly adopted and used by many family therapists despite Bateson's (1972) 
reservations. More recently, Hoffman has taken a position similar to Bateson's in this debate 
suggesting “a relative absence of hierarchy” (1988a, p. 125) and “a tendency to inhibit 
intentionality” (1988a, p. 127) as characteristics of a constructivist position for family therapy.  
She recommends that “it may be necessary to build into therapy, provision for less deliberate 
procedures....In other words, it may be important to minimize the consciousness of the therapist 
in pushing for, or strategising for, change” (Hoffman, 1988a, p. 119). 
 In an article that has initiated some discussion, Golann (1988) notes that Tomm's (e.g., 
1987) emphasis on strategizing, intention, and deliberation “may have reintroduced therapist 
power and control into systemic work in a way that corrupts Hoffman's aspirations for a 
second-order practice” (Golann, 1988, p. 62). Despite this, both Hoffman and Tomm seem to 
be influenced by the same constructivist authors. In summary, the issue here is whether or not 
adopting strategies in therapy is a legitimate position for a constructivist oriented therapist.  
 Whereas the Rogerian approach views the therapist-client relationship in a person-to-
person way, the PCT construes an expert-to-expert relation (Feixas & Villegas, 1990). Clients are 
experts in the content of their lives; nobody knows more about them than they themselves. 
However, therapists are experts in the processes of construction, in the way role relationships 
develop and, in particular, in the therapeutic process. The personal construct model of 
experience enables the therapist to be an expert about the process of construing. The content of 
the anticipations and the kind of events the person faces in light of these anticipations lie within 
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the client's domain of expertise. Therapists cannot assume knowledge of all these content issues, 
but have to learn them from every client. Furthermore, this learning about the client's content 
should be neutral, that is, not biased by judgment. The aim here is to enable the client to become 
a better scientist by developing more viable hypotheses and controls regardless of their content. 
This idea of therapy as a "research paradigm" has the advantage of limiting the power of both 
client and therapist to circumscribed areas of expertise. Since society, and thus most clients, 
invests the therapist with certain power, personal construct therapists do not find themselves in 
the paradoxical position of being at the same time (a) perceived as powerful social agents of 
change, and (b) seeking for no change and showing no exercise of power. PCT enables therapists 
to work in a responsible way for acquiring certain process changes regardless of the normative 
content of these changes. The latter is the client's responsibility. This parallels Hoffman's (1988a) 
ideas of “reciprocal” power and “shedding” power (p. 126). Within this model, also in 
concordance with Hoffman (1985), when the therapist is required to control content issues and 
acquire certain normative changes (usually in certain cases involving violence and abuse) he or 
she is acting as a social controller instead of a constructivist therapist. 
 This distinction between issues of process and content parallels Bateson's distinction 
between “Learning I” and “Learning II” (1972) and can also be compared to the distinction 
between “Change I” and “Change II”. PCT is not a model about what kind of normative 
learning a system must acquire but about the process of learning. Neither Bateson nor Kelly used 
"learning" in the conventional sense. Both viewed learning as the very process of experience and 
its construction. "Learning to learn" thus refers to the process by which we construe our 
experience; and this cannot be instructed. The only thing a therapist can do is to generate 
alternative (in)validational experiences oriented to trigger a constructive revision of the system of 
construing, to create a new “context” for learning (Bateson, 1972). 
 From a PCT perspective, it makes sense to talk about strategies and intentionality. In 
fact, any human action can be seen as intentional since it is invested with anticipations. However, 
I am talking here of strategizing about the process instead of using the usual content connotation 
of the word. Its use in the latter sense can lead to controlling the direction of client's life. 
Actually, Kelly (1969) suggested, and other construct theorists have developed (Feixas & 
Villegas, 1990; Neimeyer, 1987), theoretically grounded “process” strategies for change. In 
summary, the basic distinction between process and content employed by PCT sheds a different 
light on the inconsistencies about the issue of power, intentionality, and strategizing pointed out 
by Golann (1988). 
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 SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
 The emergence of the epistemological debate in family therapy, mainly represented by 
the March 1982 Family Process issue, questioned in some way the legitimacy of psychotherapy 
research. Later on, some elaborations (e.g., Golann, 1987; Gurman, 1983) reacted to the 
reluctance of the “new epistemologists” for psychotherapy research. The question of what kind 
of directions for research arise from a constructivist position is, however, still open. 
 Unlike many constructivist traditions, PCT has prompted derived a great deal of 
research. Neimeyer, Baker, & Neimeyer (1989) report approximately 1,700 publications using 
personal construct concepts and methods, 65% of which are research articles. Kelly's position 
about measurement and research was not directed to assess “reality”, but to view the kind of 
constructions people create through personal experience. The direction of research in PCT does 
not only go from the researcher to the lay person but also from the lay person to the researcher. 
The latter suggests a format or context (process) for the individual (or any observed system) to 
express his or her personal meanings (content). Thus, the assessment results from a co-creation 
of a unique device for that specific client or family. Moreover, there are no hidden content rules 
to evaluate or classify the client in pre-established psychopathological categories. Instead, this 
clear assessment provides some characteristics of the structural non-content qualities of the 
construing system. This is known as Kelly's credulous approach to assessment:  “If you don't know 
what is wrong with a person, ask him; he may tell you” (Kelly, 1955, p. 322).  
 Paradigmatic examples of this approach are the self-characterization (presented above as 
an adaptation to families; see also Kelly, 1955, chap. 7), and the repertory grid technique. The 
latter is a kind of semi-structured interview in which the investigator elicits relevant elements 
(usually family members and other significant figures outside the family, but it can also include 
events, places, etc.) and some dimensions of meaning (constructs) used to draw distinctions 
among those events. A further rating applying the constructs to every element allows one to do a 
statistical analysis which provides a map of the organization of the client's construct system (for 
a detailed description and applications see, e.g., Beail, 1985; Neimeyer & Neimeyer, 1981). 
Assessment using a grid has proved to be a powerful method generating theory-relevant findings 
as well as clinical guidelines for conducting therapy. Grid methods have been already successfully 
used in different studies in family research (e.g., Feixas et al., 1987; Harter et al., 1989; Procter, 
1985b., Vetere, & Gale, 1987) and family therapy training (Zaken Greenberg,  & Neimeyer, 
1986). 
 Hampson (1982) distinguishes two major orientations for psychological research and 
assessment. The first one is centered in the investigator. In this orientation, researchers propose 
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a set of dimensions relevant to their theoretical assumptions (e.g., extroversion-introversion), 
devise instruments to measure the concepts they have invented, and apply those instruments to 
people to classify them according to their theory-derived categories. On the other hand, the 
orientation centered on the client's “lay perspective” focuses its struggle on devising procedures 
to study categories people use when classifying other people and events (e.g., what kind of 
theories people construct to understand their world). Simply put, researchers in this latter 
approach are interested in eliciting meanings instead of superimposing their own meanings on 
the client. PCT, along with implicit theories of personality, fits very well with this second 
orientation. Of course, this approach is somewhat less developed (and less academically accepted 
within an objectivist paradigm) than its counterpart centered in the investigator. However, I 
think this orientation, which leads one to investigate the theories (constructs, myths, stories) that 
families co-create, appears to be the one most relevant to systemic practice. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS 
 PCT is a constructivist approach to the understanding of human experience and to 
clinical practice. Kelly evolved into this epistemological position through clinical practice, and his 
approach to explanation, assessment and intervention of human processes has been coherently 
derived from his epistemological position. Because of this experience in viewing the therapeutic 
endeavor from a constructivist point of view, PCT can be an interesting approach for systemic 
therapists to have in mind when trying to think in constructivist terms about therapy. This is 
especially pertinent if we consider the extension of PCT presented by Procter (1981, 1985a). The 
notions of position and FCS allow us to conceptualize the family processes in terms of 
constructions and actions tied to one another in interactional sequences. Moreover, this model 
enables the therapist to use any technique at hand in order to generate an alternative 
(re)construction. Therapists can also be included in the model. They provide (in)validational 
evidence that may be construed by the family in terms of their family constructs, in the same way 
that the family has interpreted previous views about the problem given by other professionals or 
relatives. 
 Current controversial issues such as the role of power, strategies, and control in therapy 
can be seen in light of the distinction used in PCT between content and process. In approaching 
the therapeutic relationship on an expert-to-expert bases, PCT attributes expertise to the client in 
terms of the content of their constructions while still regarding the therapist as an expert (as it is 
somewhat expected by society) in the form and the process by which constructs are organized 
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and applied to events. The same distinction can be applied to research where an emphasis on 
content approaches directs researchers to set forth standards to evaluate people, while a focus on 
process leads researchers to set up a context in which people may express their unique content 
and meanings. The latter is much more relevant for a practitioner in terms of guidelines for 
therapy, and more adequate for a constructivist approach to systemic family therapy. Thus, the 
integration of PCT and systemic therapies becomes an interesting though complex issue. An 
exchange of ideas and perspectives developed under the same epistemological assumption, 
constructivism, may lead to a mutual enrichment. 
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 Endnotes 
1 The distinction between "second order" and "first order" cybernetics was introduced by von Foerster (1981) and 
adopted for family systems therapy by Hoffman (1985) and Keeney (1983). While first order cybernetics was based 
on the premise of the study of an external reality, without reference to the cognitive activity that makes possible that 
study, second order cybernetics (also known as "cybernetics of observing systems" and as "cybernetics of 
cybernetics") focuses on the role of the observer in construing the observed "reality."  Since I consider this an 
epistemological constructivist position as described earlier in this article, I will use constructivism and second order 
cybernetics as interchangeable terms. 
 2 The term "contextualism" has been used in social sciences by Pepper (1942) as one of the four root 
metaphors (viz., formism, mechanism, contextualism, and organicism). Contextualism here holds both that (a) all 
knowledge is provisional, conjectural, and not leading to a conclusive "truth"; and (b) knowledge is framed by 
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contextual (relational) factors inserted in a sociohistorical and cultural context of meanings and relationships (see 14 
for therapeutic implications). Therefore, the term contextualism meets my intentions here both in "common sense" 
and in Pepper's sense. 
 3 This approach bears some similarities with Reiss' "family paradigms" (1981), Penn's "family premises" 
(1985), and with Bogdan's (1984) elaboration of Bateson's (1972) "ecology of ideas". Aside from their potential 
usefulness, Bogdan (1987) himself notes the problem that emerges with these "shared-ideas" models:  "Typically, 
family members come in to therapy with very different ideas about the problem" (p. 32). Within the FCS model this 
can be explained; since constructs -- unlike premises, concepts, or beliefs -- are bipolar dimensions of meaning. 
 
